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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
LLOYD MAX RANDQUIST, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040835-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
§78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the magistrate have a substantial basis to issue the search warrant, where 
five days earlier police found amphetamine residue in a trash can located outside 
defendant's residence, and 11 days earlier defendant's daughter was arrested for 
possession of methamphetamine? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES 
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal was taken from an order of the Fourth Judicial District Court 
dismissing the charges of Possession of a Controlled Substance, Methamphetamine, 
a first degree felony and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor 
against the appellee. The trial court granted a motion to suppress evidence obtained 
by a search pursuant to a search warrant. The motion to suppress was granted by the 
trial court and the Information was subsequently dismissed. Following that dismissal, 
the state filed a Notice of Appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There did not exist a substantial basis for the magistrate to have issued the 
search warrant under an analysis based on the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States. The affidavit in support of the search warrant contained 
information was improperly considered by the issuing magistrate. The remainder of 
the information was not sufficient to support a search warrant. 
FACTS 
Appellee adopts the facts as set forth in the opening brief of the Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE MAGISTRATE DID NOT HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS 
TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANT BECAUSE THE 
INFORMATION UPON WHICH THE WARRANT WAS BASED 
WAS EITHER IMPROPER OR STALE. 
II. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-203 provides that a search warrant shall not issue 
except upon probable cause. The probable cause required by the statute and the 
federal and state law governing the issuance of search warrants has been 
interpreted to require that the issuing magistrate must have probable cause to 
believe that the item or items sought to be seized are located in the place sought to 
be searched. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). 
In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit, this court must "examine the 
search warrant affidavit in its entirety and in a common-sense fashion, deferring to 
the magistrate's decision on whether the search warrant is supported by probable 
cause. State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Ut. App. 1992). 
Appellee argues that the trial judge was correct in finding that the affidavit 
in support of the search warrant in the present case did not provide sufficient 
probable cause to believe that the contraband sought to be seized was present in the 
residence at the time the affidavit was presented to the magistrate. 
Appellee does not challenge the ruling in State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 
(Utah App. 1997), validating the loss of any expectation of privacy in garbage 
placed curbside for collection. Appellee also agrees with appellant that the search 
warrant in Jackon was based primarily on the results of the search of the garbage. 
Opening brief of Appellant, p.l 1). 
The affidavit in Jackson case set forth that on the same day the warrant was 
issued, June 8, 1994, Jerry Harper of the Provo City Police department, had 
conducted a search of the garbage containers that had been placed curbside in front 
of the residence of the defendants. The search of the containers, which were 
identified by the residence address stenciled on the containers, yielded evidence of 
marijuana use together with correspondence to Jackson and Smith. Listed among 
the twelve paragraphs in the document, was the fact that Harper was an 
experienced police officer with training to identify drugs and drug paraphernalia. 
The affidavit stated as circumstances supporting the warrant request, the fact that 
on April 13, 1994, less than four weeks prior to the issuance of the warrant, the 
residence of the defendants was broken into and several unidentified men held the 
defendants captive and demanded drugs and money. The affidavit also set forth the 
fact that Jackson had pled guilty to marijuana and drug paraphernalia possession 
on May 3, 1993. Ibid, 546, 547. 
The appellate court commented on the affidavit information as follows: 
Defendants also argue that the April 1994 break-in incident and the 
prior criminal conviction of defendant Smith constitute stale and irrelevant 
information, which should not have been considered the magistrate in 
making his probable cause determination. We largely agree with defendants 
in this respect. However, we are persuaded that the magistrate would have 
found probable cause even absent any information about the April 1994 
incident and Smith's prior conviction. Thus, defendant's staleness 
argument, even if well taken, is not dispositive. We therefore conclude that 
the affidavit contained sufficient facts to support the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause. Ibid, at 548. 
Appellant submits that, as the trial court found, the search warrant in the present 
case was based primarily on the garbage container search. 
The affidavit in support of the warrant in the present case was presented on 
January 26, 2004. Among the five paragraphs of the affidavit was listed the facts 
setting forth the experience and training of the affiant officer, the fact that on 
January 21, 2004, at 9:00 a,m. the officer had conducted a search of the garbage 
container located in front of the appellee's residence and found "five small clear 
plastic baggies with residue in them." One of the baggies field-tested positive for 
methamphetamine. In the container was also located correspondence to appellee 
and his daughter. The affidavit also set forth that the affiant had received 
information that Jessica Randquist, appellee's daughter, had been arrested in Orem, 
Utah, on January 15, 2004, for possession of drug paraphernalia and that her 
residence was 1390 West 1320 North, Provo, Utah. The affidavit also set forth the 
fact that appellee lives at the same address and that he "has a criminal history for 
possession of methamphetamine." 
The trial court discounted the relevancy of the information on the arrest of 
Jessica and the allegation of prior drug criminal history of appellee. Appellee 
argues that the trial court was correct in that determination. 
First, the allegation that Jessica Vest had been arrested on January 15, 2004, 
in Orem, Utah, does not give any reason to believe that on January 26, 2004, there 
would be contraband at her residence. There is no evidence that Vest indicated to 
the officers making the arrest that she kept additional controlled substances in her 
parents home or any observations or investigation resulting from her arrest which 
established that fact. 
In State v. Dable, 81 P.3d 783, 787 (Utah App. 2003), a magistrate issued a 
warrant for the search of the defendant's residence. The affidavit in support of the 
warrant set forth the following facts: (1) Wyoming law enforcement officers had 
arrested the defendant for possession of methamphetamine; (2) defendant had 
stopped at her home for a few hours after purchasing the methamphetamine; and 
(3) a named Utah informant stated that he had purchased methamphetamine of the 
defendant on at least two occasions. 81 P.3d at 786. 
This Court reviewed the affidavit to determine whether or not the magistrate 
had a substantial base for determining that probable cause existed. In considering 
the first basis, that defendant had been arrested in Wyoming for possession of 
methamphetamine and that she admitted to the officers that she had stopped at her 
residence in Utah for a few hours after purchasing drugs, the court found no "nexus 
between the suspected criminal activity and the place to be searched." 81 P.3d at 
787. 
The court then considered the statements of the informant alleging that he 
had purchased drugs from the defendant on two occasions. The court found that 
the information from the informant was not reliable since the law enforcement 
officers seeking the warrant had omitted information about the informant which 
would have aided the magistrate in assessing the reliability of the informant. 
The court held that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause of illegal 
activity, because the Wyoming information did not provide a sufficient nexus to 
believe that drugs were at the residence and the nonspecific information of the 
informant did provide sufficient reliability without corroboration by the officers. 
If there was either surveillance by law enforcement which indicated drug 
trafficking or reliable informant information to support the garbage findings, the 
case for probable cause would be stronger. In this case there is none of that 
additional evidence to support the affidavit. 
Second, the allegation that at some point in the past, the defendant had a 
conviction for possession of methamphetamine is does not provide probable cause 
to support the issuance of a search warrant. The fact that at some unspecified date 
in the past a defendant had a "criminal history" of possession of controlled 
substances is as unreliable as the general nonspecific information from the 
informant in Dable. The information in Jackson was much more specific, setting 
forth the date and some facts about the a prior conviction of Jackson. The present 
affidavit sets forth no information as to whether the "criminal history" included 
convictions, and, if so, the dates of any such conviction or drug history. If the 
affidavit had been more specific in informing the court as to the dates and nature of 
the "criminal history" the magistrate would have been able to weigh the relevance 
of that information and give it whatever weight the magistrate deemed justified. 
Absent that information, the magistrate cannot speculate or assume that the "drug 
history" is recent or relevant. 
Assuming that the "criminal history" involves a conviction or convictions 
for methamphetamine offenses, if those convictions occurred more than five or ten 
years ago, the "criminal history" would bear little or no probable cause to support a 
warrant. Without that specificity, the value of the information is lacking. 
Appellee argues that the validity of the warrant in this case, like Jackson, is 
dependent on the reliability of the garbage container evidence. The issue is 
whether or not the trial judge's determination that was stale as a result of the five 
day delay. 
The staleness issue was considered by the Jackson court and discounted on 
the basis that" the magistrate could fairly infer, given the fact of weekly 
collection, that the contraband had not been lying around for more than one week". 
The court determined that one week was not a significant enough time to "bar the 
magistrate from concluding there was probable cause to believe that drugs would 
be found inside defendants' home." Ibid., at 548. 
Unlike the officer in Jackson, who sought the warrant the same day he 
performed the garbage can search, the officer in appellee's case did not seek a 
warrant until five days later. Given the fact that no other information in the 
affidavit would support a probable cause finding, the time period between the 
garbage search and the application of the warrant is vital. 
The most that can derived from a common sense evaluation of garbage 
search evidence is that someone discarded baggies which at some point contained 
methamphetamine. It is also a reasonable assumption, based upon the 
identification of the location of the containers and the letters addressed to appellee, 
that it is possible that the appellee or someone in his home deposited the empty 
baggies into the garbage container. 
The difficulty comes with the ultimate question: Does the fact that 
contraband was once present in the residence constitute probable cause to believe 
that contraband is there at the time of the issuance of the warrant? Absent some 
additional corroborating information, such as information from an informant that 
suspects routinely kept a quantity of contraband in the residence, surveillance by 
officers noting traffic in and out of the residence consistent with distribution 
activity or similar information to assist the magistrate, appellee submits the 
reliability of the information substantially declines with each day that passes. 
Further, the warrant in the present case allows a search to occur "within ten 
days from the date of issuance". Appellee suggests that where the officer to whom 
the warrant is issued can hold the warrant for an additional ten days prior to 
executing the search, the probability of there being contraband at a residence is 
even less likely. An equally reasonable assumption would be that there were no 
drugs in the residence, having been used and the remnants discarded. In the 
present case, the warrant was not served until February 3, 2004, over twelve days 
after the search of the garbage container. When one considers the time allowed by 
the issuing court for the execution of the warrant, the reliability of the 
uncorroborated information derived from the garbage search is negligible. 
Based upon the nature of the information which formed the basis of the 
magistrate's determination of probable cause, appellee argues that the trial court 
judge was correct in suppressing the evidence obtained during the search. The 
ruing of the trial court should be upheld. 
II. THE LEON GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION SHOULD NOT 
APPLY. 
Appellee submits the good faith exception of Leon does not apply here for 
the reason that the issuing magistrate did not perform it's neutral and detached 
function by considering information which was inappropriate and stale. Also the 
appellee contends that the officer's action in creating delay in obtaining the 
warrant and subsequent delay in serving the warrant were not done in good faith. 
The delay of the officer at least in part contributed to the problems with the warrant 
and thereby violated the appellee's right to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure. Law enforcement officers should be encouraged to be timely in both 
obtaining and executing warrants and should not be rewarded for delay where, as 
in this case, there is no explanation or reason given for delay. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, appellee asks this court to affirm the dismissal of 
this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this ^  day of March, 2005. 
Attorney for Appellee 
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AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI 
GTON, Presidt. AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in t ime of peace, be quartered in any house, without the 
consent of the Owner, nor in t ime of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by 
law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
19 
77-23-203 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
illegal conduct " State v Womack 967 P 2 d 536 totahty of the circumstances State v Weav 
(Utah Ct App 1998) 817 P 2 d 830 (Utah Ct App 1991) e r 
Probable cause 
Probable cause is to be determined by the 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 8 Am Ju r 2d Searches and C.J.S. — 79 C J S Searches and Seizures 
Seizures § 117 et seq § 70 et seq 
77-23-203. Conditions precedent to issuance. 
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation particularly describing the person or place to be 
searched and the person, property, or evidence to be seized 
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct, and is in the 
possession of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause 
shown to the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party to the 
alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding by 
the magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by 
subpoena, or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or 
altered if sought by subpoena If such a finding is made and a search warrant 
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such conditions that 
reasonably afford protection of the following interests of the person or entity in 
possession of such evidence 
(a) protection against unreasonable interference with normal business, 
(b) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected confidential 
sources of information, or 
(c) protection against prior or direct restraints on constitutionally 
protected rights. 
History: C. 1953, 77-23-3, enacted b y L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; renumbered by L. 1994, 
ch. 142, § 5. 
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underlying circumstances justifying a conclu Thurman, 846 P 2 d 1256 (Utah 1993) 
sion of the informant's reliability and credibil-
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aty State v Port, 572 P 2 d 1387 (Utah 1977) Sufficient probable cause. 
Search warrant stating among other tilings, 
Standard of review. t ha t deputy had reason to believe property was 
In reviewing a magistrate's finding of prob- stolen, with an inventory of such property at 
able cause to suppport a search warrant based tached to affidavit, tha t evidence tended to 
on an affidavit, the appellate court will find the show felony had been committed and that cer 
warrant invalid only if the magistrate given tarn witnesses had revealed mformation as to 
the totahty of circumstances lacked a substan person committing felony showed sufficient 
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udge by 
Luties of 
and 
Judicial 
upreme 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
. proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
. Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; , 
.
 :(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
. the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; - ' 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal eases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;... 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a.challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
, for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
4
 including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any mat te r over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. -
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
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1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch; 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, 
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49; 2001, ch . 255, 
§ 20; 2001, ch. 302, § 2. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2001 amend-
ment by ch. 255, effective April 30, 2001, added 
"parent-time" in Subsection (2)(h). 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 302, effective 
April 30, 2001, inserted "or charge" in Subsec-
tion (2)(e) and made stylistic changes. 
This section has been reconciled by the Office 
of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
Cross -References . — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16, 
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